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ABSTRACT
This letter proposes a novel key distribution protocol with no key exchange in advance, which is secure as  
the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol.  Our protocol utilizes  a photon in superposition state  for  
single-bit data transmission instead of a classical electrical/optical signal.  The security of this protocol  
relies on the fact, that the arbitrary quantum state cannot be cloned, known as the no-cloning theorem.  
This protocol can be implemented with current technologies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Research on quantum computation has been getting more and more attention for the last two 
decades.  It is known that, once a quantum computer is built, the existing popular public-key 
encryption  algorithms  (e.g.,  RSA,  elliptic  curve  cryptography)  may  be  compromised  in 
polynomial time [1]  [2].  Therefore, cryptographic schemes which do not rely on computational 
complexity, have been expected.  Quantum cryptography is one, that is theoretically unbreakable 
and does not rely on computational complexity, but on quantum mechanical properties.  
Although many quantum cryptographic schemes have been proposed [3] [4] [5] [6], the one well 
researched  and  realized  experimentally  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]  [11]  is  the  quantum key distribution 
protocol  (QKD).   Also,  some QKD commercial  products are available [12] [13].   The QKD 
schemes, in general, utilized photons to transfer classical bit information.  For example, in the 
BB84 protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [14], a sender (Alice) chooses one of 
two different orthogonal base sets (i.e., {horizontal, vertical} or { 45, 45+ − }) and sends one of 
two polarization states in the chosen base. The receiver (Bob) measures the received photon with 
the one chosen randomly out of the two base sets. After a certain amount of photons have been 
transmitted, Alice and Bob exchange the information, by using a classical channel, about the base 
sets that they used for polarizations and measurements so that they can share the same data bits. 
In 1991, Ekert proposed a key distribution protocol using the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) 
pair and Bell’s inequality [15].  In1992, Bennett simplified BB84 using only one non-orthogonal 
base [16].  Since both a sender and a receiver will randomly choose one of the two orthogonal 
base  sets,  the  processes  of  generating  a  key bit  sequence  in  these  three  QKD protocols  are 
nondeterministic.  Also, lots of transmitted data will be discarded during the process of sifting 
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through data bits in these QKD systems. Recently, deterministic key distribution protocols are 
proposed. Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) is implemented by exchanging single 
photons with classical channel [17].  Ping-pong QSDC uses EPR pairs [18].  The weaknesses of 
the ping-pong scheme were found by Wójcik [19] and Cai [20].  They improved the ping-pong 
scheme.  QSDC with a one-time pad is also proposed [21] [22].  Quantum dense key distribution 
utilizes QKD and quantum dense coding [23] to implement the key distribution enhancing the 
capacity of transmission [24] [25] [26].
In this paper, we propose a quantum key distribution protocol utilizing a quantum superposition 
state, called Quantum Three Pass Protocol (QTTP) [27]. This protocol provides the same security 
as BB84 does. The security relies on the fact that the arbitrary quantum state cannot be cloned 
[28],  known as  the  no-cloning  theorem [29].    The  QTPP requires  neither  key-exchange  in 
advance,  nor  communication on classical  channels,  unlike  the  QSDC.   There  are  three  main 
advantages compared to BB84. First, since the QTPP is a deterministic secure communication 
protocol, all data bits received from a sender can be used as encryption keys ideally, while BB84 
needs to discard half of the transmitted data because the probability that both Alice and Bob use 
the  same  orthogonal  bases  is  50  % [30].   Since  the  data  bit  sequence  to  be  transmitted  is 
determined in advance, existing error correcting codes can be applied to the data bits in order to 
reduce transmission errors.  Second, the QTPP system can detect the existence of eavesdroppers 
even under severely noisy environments where BB84 cannot detect them.  Third, as long as the 
measurement  base  stays  still  during  the  session,  the  QTPP does  not  require  as  precise  base 
alignments as does BB84 to encrypt quantum states.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we introduce a classical three-pass protocol.  In 
section 3, we present our protocol  QTPP, and the security analysis  is presented in section 4. 
Finally, conclusions are presented in section 5.
2. THREE-PASS PROTOCOL
Let us consider a figurative example of our three-pass protocol.   There is a way to deliver a 
message in a box securely to a receiver using two padlocks, without sharing keys to open the 
locks.  First, Alice locks the box with her padlock and sends the box to Bob.  Bob receives the 
box and locks the box with his padlock and sends the box to Alice.  At this point, the box has two 
padlocks.   Then,  Alice takes off  her padlock from the box and sends it  again to Bob.   Bob 
removes his padlock from the box. Bob got the message securely from Alice.  If we use this idea 
in  cryptography,  the  algorithm  establishes  secure  communication  with  no  key-exchange  in 
advance. 
This protocol may be realized by utilizing exclusive-OR (XOR) operations.  First, Alice performs 
XOR of a message M with her key KA and sends the result AM K⊕  to Bob. (‘ ⊕ ’ denotes XOR 
operation.)  Bob performs XOR of AM K⊕ with his key KB and sends A BM K K⊕ ⊕  to Alice. 
Alice performs XOR of the received massage  A BM K K⊕ ⊕  with her key  KA and sends the 
resulting message BM K⊕  to Bob.  Bob performs XOR of BM K⊕ with his key KB and gets M 
from Alice securely.   This interesting protocol seems to allow us to communicate each other 
securely without sharing the secret keys.  However, there is a fatal weakness in this scheme.  If 
Eve (who eavesdrops on the communication) can make a copy of all three messages exchanged 
between Alice and Bob, Eve can retrieve the original message M by simply performing XOR of 
all three messages as follows:    
( ) ( ) ( )A A B BM K M K K M K M⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ =
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Therefore,  this  three-pass  protocol  with  simple  XORs  does  not  work.   Shamir’s  three-pass 
protocol  (never published but  introduced by Massey [31])  uses a discrete logarithm problem 
instead of a simple XOR operation to avoid the above weakness, but it has never been proved 
[32].  Shamir’s protocol requires encryption keys that are correlated to each other. Thus, it is no 
longer a protocol with no key-exchange in advance.  The problem of the three-pass protocol with 
XORs comes from the fact, that an eavesdropper can make copies of the transmitted messages. 
As  long as  a  classical  computer  uses  a  classical  signal  (e.g.,  electrical  or  optical  signal)  for 
transmissions, the three-pass protocol seems to be infeasible since eavesdroppers can easily make 
copies of the transmitted data and analyze them.  
However, Quantum Mechanics makes it feasible to implement this three-pass protocol without 
key-exchange in advance. The QTPP utilizes a particle (e.g., photon) in quantum superposition 
states for one bit transmission, instead of a classical signal.
3. QUANTUM THREE-PASS PROTOCOL (QTPP)
Unlike the BB84 protocol, QTPP requires only quantum channels.  Classical one-bit information 
is encoded into a single particle, called a “quantum bit” or “qubit” whose state is represented by 
using a vector (e.g.,  0 or 1 ,) called “ket” vector in Dirac notation.  In this paper, we assume 
that a photon is used as a qubit. (Henceforth, we use photon and qubit interchangeably.)  We use 
a photon as a qubit and one polarization base set {horizontal, vertical} to represent a classical two 
level system.  A horizontally polarized photon represents logic zero, ( )0 1 0 T=  and a vertically 
polarized photon represents logic one, ( )1 0 1 T= .  When a sender’s message M  has n classical 
bits,  the  encoded  qubit  states  can  be  represented  as  1 2 3 ... jM i i i i= ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ,  where 
{ | 0 1, 1,2, ..., }j ji i or j n= = . ‘ ⊗ ’ represents a tensor product.  After an n-bit message is encoded 
into  n photons,  the  polarization  of  each  photon  is  rotated  by an  angle  jθ ,  which  is  chosen 
randomly  for  each  qubit.   The  rotating  operation  can  be  considered  as  an  encryption  and 
represented as 
cos sin
( )
sin cos
j j
j
j j
R
θ θ
θ θ θ
 
=  
−  .
The angle jθ can be considered as an encryption key. (Decryption can be performed by rotation 
with the angle  jθ− .) Since each qubit requires a different angle, this encryption is similar to a 
classical  one-time  pad  which  is  a  perfect  encryption  scheme  in  classical  cryptography  [32]. 
However, in a QTPP system, the key is not shared between users unlike the one-time pad system. 
Alice and Bob generate their own secret key KA and KB (K={ | 0 , 1,2, ... , }j j j nθ θ pi≤ < = ) for each 
session. Those session keys are never disclosed to anyone.  Each session key is used only twice in 
the session by the generator: once for encryption and once for decryption. After each session, the 
key is discarded and a new key is generated to prevent any information related to the session key 
and data from being leaked.  
In the following discussion, without losing generality, we can assume that message M  is single 
photon encoded as 0M =  (i.e., 1n =  and 1 0i = ) and Alice initiates a key distribution (Refer to 
Figure 1). First, Alice and Bob generate their session keys A AK θ=  and B BK θ= .  Alice encrypts 
M with her encryption key KA. The resulting state can be described as 
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1
cos sin 1
[ ]: ( ) 0 cos 0 sin 1
sin cos 0A
A A
K A A A
A A
E M R
θ θ
θ θ θ ψ
θ θ
  
= = ⋅ − ⋅ =  
−    ,
where AKE indicates an encryption with KA. Such a resulting state is called a superposition state. 
Alice sends the resulting state 1ψ to Bob.  Bob receives the photon in 1ψ  and encrypts it with 
his key KB.  
1 2[ [ ]] : ( ) cos( ) 0 sin( ) 1 .B AK K B B A B AE E M R θ ψ θ θ θ θ ψ⋅ = + − + =
The resulting state 2ψ  is still a superposition state.  Bob sends it back to Alice.  Alice receives 
and decrypts it by rotating it back with the angle Aθ  (i.e., rotation of Aθ− ) and sends the resulting 
superposition state 3ψ  to Bob. 
2 3[ [ [ ]]] [ ] : ( ) cos 0 sin 1K B A BA K K K A B BD E E M E M R θ ψ θ θ ψ= − ⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅ = ,
where AKD indicates an decryption with KA. Bob receives and decrypts it by rotating it back with 
the angle Bθ  (i.e., rotation of Bθ− ).
3
cos( ) sin( ) cos 1
[ [ ]] : ( ) 0
sin( ) cos( ) sin 0K BB
B B B
K B
B B B
D E M R
θ θ θ
θ ψ
θ θ θ
− −     
− ⋅ = ⋅ = =     
− − − −      .
Now, Bob has the original message 0M = .  
 
Figure 1: QTPP protocol example
4. SECURITY OF QTPP
As mentioned earlier, the classical three-pass protocol with XORs does not work, because Eve 
(an eavesdropper)  can copy the transmitted data and retrieve the plain message.   In order to 
prevent Eve from copying the data bits, the QTPP uses a particle in quantum superposition state 
as  the  media  of  the  one-bit  transmission.   In  a  quantum system,  the  replication  of  arbitrary 
quantum state (i.e.,  0 1a b+ ,  a and  b are arbitrary coefficients)  is  infeasible [28] [29].   In 
short, Eve cannot copy the transmitted data encoded in superposition states without errors.  Eve 
may try to apply intercept-resend attack [33] instead of copying the data.  However, the QTPP is 
also secure against the intercept-resend strategy.  When Eve intercepts a photon that was in logic 
zero  state  (i.e.,  0ψ = )  before  it  was  encrypted,  the  state  of  the  received  photon  can  be 
represented as cos 0 sin 1ψ θ θ= − . The angle θ  is always unknown to Eve.  Both “ cosθ ” 
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and “ sinθ− ” are the probability amplitude of the quantum state.   If Eve tries to read the data in 
this  photon,  she will  observe  0  with probability  2cosθ and  1  with probability  2sinθ− . 
When Eve intercepts a photon that was in logic one state (i.e., 1ψ = ) before it was encrypted, 
the state of the received photon can be represented as sin 0 cos 1ψ θ θ= + .  Therefore, as far 
as the classical data bits (i.e.,  logic zero and one) are encoded randomly into photons, Eve’s 
measurement result will be 0  with probability 
2 21 1cos sin2 2θ θ+  and 1  with probability 
2 21 1sin cos2 2θ θ− + .   When we use the QTPP for key distribution, the message data is a 
sequence  of  random  bits.   As  a  result,  Eve  will  observe  0 or  1  with  probability  12 . 
Therefore, the QTPP guarantees the confidentiality of communication.  Eve cannot resend the 
intercepted data to Bob without errors.
Also, the existence of Eve can be detected, because Eve’s intercept-resend attack increases the bit 
error rate up to 50%.  This bit error rate, caused by eavesdropping, is much higher than the one of 
the BB84 (i.e., 25% [30]).   In short, eavesdroppers can be detected more easily in the QTPP 
system than a system with the BB84 protocol.   Moreover, when the error rate is significantly 
increased, higher than 25 % because of severe noisy environments, the BB84 protocol system no 
longer  distinguishes  between  the  transmission  error  caused  by  Eve  and  the  one  caused  by 
innocent noisy environment, while the QTPP system is still able to detect the existence of Eve 
under such a circumstance, unless the error rate becomes close to 50 %.  
Another possible attempt to get information from the transmitted data is that, Eve may entangle 
the intercepted data with Eve’s qubit, which is called individual particle attack [33].   However, 
Eve will still observe  0 or  1  randomly.   For example, Eve can apply controlled-NOT [29] 
operation to the transmitted data as the control bit and her qubit 0 and 1  as the target bit.  In 
this case, Alice and Bob cannot detect the eavesdropping since this operation does not change the 
state of the transmitted qubit.  Using this technique, Eve can entangle her three qubits with three 
transmitted  data  qubits  (i.e.,  Alice → Bob,  Bob → Alice,  Alice → Bob)  and  apply  unitary 
operations with her three qubits in order to try to get the plain message.  However, Eve cannot 
retrieve the plain data bit, because Eve does not know the states of entangled particles and the 
angles of Alice and Bob. 
5. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a quantum three-pass protocol (QTPP).  This protocol makes use of the 
advantage of the classical three-pass protocol and the advantage of quantum mechanical property. 
Since  this  protocol  uses  all  transmitted  data  unlike  the  BB84,  it  can  be  used  not  only  for 
deterministic  QKD,  but  also for  data  transmission  utilizing classical  existing error  correcting 
codes.  The security against the known and practical feasible attacks was discussed.  The QTPP 
can detect eavesdroppers under a severe noisy environment where the BB84 may not be able to 
detect eavesdroppers. Also, as long as the measurement base stays still during the session, the 
QTPP  does  not  require  as  precise  base  alignments  as  the  BB84  does  because  the  slight 
discrepancy of polarization angles caused by misalignments can be included into part of a key 
angle. 
Just like the BB84 protocol [34], the QTPP requires an authentication before the key distribution 
process starts.   A simple authentication can be implemented by sharing a secret bit  sequence 
between participants as a key and performing XOR of the shared key with a message (e.g., key to 
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be distributed) prior to the key distribution process introduced in this paper. Moreover, the QTPP 
scheme can be modified for other cryptographic schemes (e.g., authentication, secret sharing).
Even though polarization encoding is  used in this paper to make a superposition state,  phase 
encoding would be also applied to the QTPP.  This protocol can be implemented with the current 
technologies (i.e., single photon source and detector, mirror and faraday rotator) and is a good 
example  of  how an  infeasible  protocol  in  a  classical  computer  system can  be  realized  with 
quantum mechanical resources.
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